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absolute reductions in emissions are associated with signifi-
cant reductions in firms’ emissions. Our evidence suggests 
the need for vigilance among policy-makers and environ-
mental campaigners regarding the underlying intentions that 
accompany environmental management practices and shows 
that these can to some extent be diagnosed analytically.
Keywords Carbon dependency · Climate change targets · 
Environmental performance · Environmental strategy · 
Greenhouse gas emissions · Greenwashing
Introduction
Addressing climate change is among the most pressing 
ethical challenges facing contemporary business and soci-
ety (Howard-Grenville et al. 2014; Vatican 2016). Current, 
unsustainable business models and practices generate pro-
found and varied injustices (Slawinski et al. 2017). The 
borderless nature of greenhouse gas emissions creates sig-
nificant distributive, procedural, and spatial challenges in 
which emissions generated in one part of the world impact 
geographically distant locations in ways that are further 
exacerbated by variation in vulnerability and capacity to 
respond (Haney 2015). Moreover, it is widely recognized 
that current injustices associated with climate change are 
likely to intensify over time and extend to future genera-
tions (Besio and Pronzini 2014). Businesses are major pol-
luters and already profit at the expense of the broader public 
through largely costless externalities. They thus face moral 
responsibilities to mitigate their impacts by reducing their 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions as part of a transition to a 
sustainable, low-carbon economy (Besio and Pronzini 2014; 
Haney 2015; Stern 2006).
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Interest in business responses to climate change is 
reflected in the significant growth of research especially on 
the strategies and practices that aim to reduce firms’ carbon 
footprints1 (Aragón-Correa et al. 2016; Delmas and Toffel 
2008; Hahn et al. 2015; Wright and Nyberg 2016). Despite 
increasing scrutiny and pressure to address environmental 
issues associated with their activities, empirical evidence 
suggests that firms’ commitment to improving environmen-
tal impacts varies significantly due to the cognitive, strategic, 
technical, and managerial challenges in operating in more 
sustainable ways (Alt et al. 2015; Hussain et al. 2016; Post 
et al. 2015). Prior research has identified a number of rea-
sons for businesses to engage in environmental management, 
including pre-empting or responding to regulatory pressures 
(Berrone and Gomez-Mejia 2009; Boiral 2007; Delmas and 
Toffel 2008; Delmas and Montes-Sancho 2010), reducing 
costs by eliminating waste (Porter and Van der Linde 1995), 
attracting environmentally conscious customers, employees, 
and investors (Alt et al. 2015; Flammer 2013), and build-
ing and sustaining legitimacy among external stakeholders, 
often by imitating peer organizations (Bansal 2005; Bansal 
and Clelland 2004; Berrone et al. 2017). Research suggests 
that the levels and forms of environmental pressures and 
opportunities are strongly associated with firm characteris-
tics, including industry sector and size (Darnall et al. 2010), 
and that these translate into variations of organizational 
commitment to environmental issues (Sharma 2000). This 
variation in the intensity and types of motives to address 
environmental impacts is mirrored in the voluntary adop-
tion and implementation of environmental tools, practices, 
and initiatives such as (certified) environmental manage-
ment systems (Boiral 2007), public commitments to act on 
environmental issues (Delmas and Montes-Sancho 2010), 
and disclosure of environmental achievements and impacts 
(Andrew and Cortese 2011; Hahn et al. 2015).
Yet one major concern is that pressures on firms to act 
on environmental issues have also generated incentives for 
firms to communicate environmental commitments that are 
not reflected in concrete action on environmental issues 
(Aragón-Correa et al. 2016). Typically, critical research 
argues that firms engage in “greenwash,” defined as “any 
communication that misleads people into adopting overly 
positive beliefs about an organization’s environmental per-
formance, practices or products” (Lyon and Montgomery 
2015, p. 226), although recent research has suggested that 
greenwashing is only one of many forms of decoupling 
whereby environmental communication and performance 
differ at the firm level (Bowen 2014; Crilly et al. 2012; 
Lyon and Maxwell 2011). Whatever the underlying pro-
cesses and mechanisms, much research echoes a perception 
that some firms adopt a relatively symbolic, or decoupled, 
approach to managing their environmental impacts, while 
others are committed to more substantive implementation 
of their environmental commitments (Berrone et al. 2017). 
Calls continue for a critical approach toward examining the 
outcomes of especially voluntary environmental practices 
(Bowen 2014, 2017; Delmas and Burbano 2011).
Here, we focus on a specific environmental management 
practice that has proliferated in recent years but remains rel-
atively little studied: firms’ climate change targets. A grow-
ing number of global initiatives are supporting corporate 
non-financial target-setting efforts, including Science-Based 
Targets (GHG emissions), Pivot Goals (sustainability), the 
Forest500 (deforestation), the EP100 (energy productiv-
ity), and the RE1002 (renewable energy), with large firms 
now commonly setting climate change targets. For example, 
Walmart states it has “a long-term, aspirational goal to be 
supplied 100% by renewable energy.” Similarly, Austrian 
electric utility “VERBUND aims to be carbon neutral by 
2050” and the German car manufacturer BMW Group “will 
reduce total CO2 emissions of its production network from 
1990 to 2020 by 30%.” Dow Chemical declares, “the cur‑
rent long term target is that scope 1 and scope 2 Kyoto GHG 
emissions will not exceed 1990 levels through 2025. The 
strategy is to grow the company while not increasing GHG 
emissions,” and UK retailer Tesco has the “target to be a 
zero-carbon business, without purchasing offsets, by 2050.” 
While research has recently begun to explore the role and 
effectiveness of companies setting a range of sustainabil-
ity targets, particularly as part of executive remuneration 
schemes (Ioannou et al. 2016; Kolk and Perego 2014; Maas 
2016; Maas and Rosendaal 2016; Pinkse and Busch 2013; 
Pinkse and Kolk 2009), there remains a notable lack of 
empirical evidence regarding the effectiveness of targets on 
non-financial performance outcomes, and the contingencies 
that intervene in these processes (Di Norcia 1996; Ioannou 
et al. 2016; Russo and Harrison 2005).
In this paper, we investigate the relationships between 
the presence and nature of firms’ climate change targets 
and changes in their corporate carbon footprints. Draw-
ing on environmental management literature, we develop 
a conceptualization that views climate change targets as 
reflecting firms’ range of strategic and symbolic inten-
tions about environmental performance improvement. 
We hypothesize that the impacts of such targets on GHG 
1 ‘Corporate carbon footprints’ are a widely used metaphor for firms’ 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions contributing to anthropogenic cli-
mate change. Carbon footprints include carbon but also other types 
of GHG emissions. In this paper, we use carbon footprints and GHG 
emissions interchangeably.
2 For more details, please see www.sciencebasedtargets.org; www.
pivotgoals.com; www.forest500.org; www.theclimategroup.org/pro-
ject/ep100; www.there100.org.
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emissions trends depend on the extent to which they are 
underpinned by substantive intentions to address climate 
change. We test our hypotheses in the context of a sample 
of over 1000 global companies that are participants in 
the CDP, for which unique data concerning the detailed 
character of their GHG emissions reduction targets are 
available.
Our paper makes two important contributions. First, we 
contribute significantly new empirical evidence regarding 
the influence of voluntary managerial practices on firms’ 
environmental performance. Our aim is to “peel back the 
onion” of environmental performance (Russo and Har-
rison 2005, p. 582) by providing new evidence into the 
importance of the presence and nature of firms’ climate 
change targets for emissions reduction, thus overcoming 
some of the methodological challenges that have ham-
pered prior research on corporate environmental perfor-
mance. Our focus on the influences on firms’ greenhouse 
gas emissions generates new evidence and insights into 
whether and when specific voluntary managerial practices 
can help firms addressing important global sustainability 
challenges, such as increasing their efforts toward miti-
gating climate change.
Second, we contribute new evidence to the broader 
debates concerning the role of organizational aspirations 
in shaping organizational, particularly non-financial, 
outcomes. Specifically, our paper develops a concep-
tualization of climate change targets that differentiates 
their application as either substantive strategic manage-
ment or symbolic legitimization tools. By differentiat-
ing between the intentions of employing climate change 
targets, we shed new light on the efficacy and limitations 
of non-financial target setting and the circumstances in 
which they are most likely to improve performance. Thus, 
we extend the very limited body of research on targets, 
which has long been constrained because prior research 
has seldom been able to directly observe outcomes of 
target-setting processes, instead drawing from patterns 
in prior organizational performance to make inferences 
regarding levels of, and likely changes to, firms’ organi-
zational aspirations (Bromiley and Harris 2014; Wash-
burn and Bromiley 2012). We extend theory on target 
setting and begin to grow empirical research on the effi-
cacy of climate change targets by critiquing their use in 
circumstances where firms seek to gain purely symbolic 
benefits, and provide evidence of the impacts of targets 
on environmental performance (Hahn et al. 2014).
The next section develops our conceptual model and 
outlines our hypotheses. We then describe our methods 
and findings before discussing the implications of our 
analysis. A final section concludes.
Conceptual Development and Hypotheses
Prior Research on Non‑Financial Performance Targets
Pinkse and Busch (2013) summarized four broad factors 
enabling and constraining the use of carbon norms. These 
carbon norms reflect public declarations and voluntary 
commitments to constrain their firms’ impact on the global 
climate and are thus largely equivalent to climate change 
targets. Both company image and aim are argued to shape 
how firms seek to improve their strategic positioning by 
using climate change targets (Pinkse and Busch 2013). The 
authors distinguish between aims of strategic differentia-
tion from competitors and standardization to level industry 
practices. By contrast, companies can also set targets to 
signal either a desired future image or an improved cur-
rent image. In the latter cases, the underlying intention is 
one of symbolic impression management and legitimacy 
enhancement, often associated with accusations of green-
wash (Berrone et al. 2017; Delmas and Burbano 2011; 
Pinkse and Busch 2013). This variation in approaches is 
explored in four Dutch case studies by Kolk and Perego 
(2014) who struggled to find unanimous evidence on 
whether corporate social performance (CSP) targets in 
executive remuneration reflect either substantive efforts 
to address social responsibility or more symbolic efforts 
of window dressing, potentially even the gaming of bonus 
payment schemes. Exploring the use of climate change 
targets in carbon reduction projects, Ioannou et al. (2016) 
found that firms setting more difficult targets complete 
a higher percentage of their carbon emissions reduction 
targets and that this relationship is negatively moderated 
by the provision of monetary incentives. Arguably, tar-
get difficulty could be equated to substantive intentions 
reflecting more sincere attempts to improve environmental 
performance.
Maas and Rosendaal (2016) also explored the use and 
nature of broader sustainability targets in executive remu-
neration among a sample of global multinationals finding 
significant variation in target-setting behaviors. Yet although 
targets could generally vary by temporal focus (short term 
and long term) and by sustainability content (environmen-
tal, social or a combination of both), they were chiefly used 
by firms in dirtier industries and predominantly focused on 
short-term outcomes and social issues. Studying the effec-
tiveness of corporate social performance targets among the 
S&P 500, Maas (2016) found that that while qualitative, 
soft CSP targets in executive compensation appear to be 
mainly used for symbolic reasons, only quantitative, hard 
targets were showing improved CSP results, thus being sug-
gestive of substantive intentions. Further evidence on tar-
gets and compensation regimes suggests that when tied to 
financial incentives, such targets may lead to environmental 
4 F. Dahlmann et al.
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performance improvements (Berrone and Gomez-Mejia 
2009; Cordeiro and Sarkis 2008; Russo and Harrison 2005).
In sum, extant findings paint a patchy, and particularly 
often executive-level focused, picture of the use and effec-
tiveness of non-financial performance targets. Importantly, 
however, the repeated calls for and references to drawing 
a distinction between substantive and symbolic intentions 
underpinning target-setting behavior in this context highlight 
the need for both conceptual and methodological clarity dur-
ing hypothesis specification.
Conceptual Model
Our theorization of the relationship between firms’ cli-
mate change targets and their environmental outcomes is 
grounded in prior research that recognizes that a wide range 
of intentions underpin firms’ environmental management 
activities (Berrone and Gomez-Mejia 2009; Kolk and Perego 
2014) and that the relationship between these activities and 
environmental outcomes is therefore complex (di Norcia 
1996). Ambiguous evidence in relation to environmental 
management practices in general (Hussain et al. 2016), and 
particularly target setting (Berrone and Gomez-Mejia 2009; 
Cordeiro and Sarkis 2008; Russo and Harrison 2005), has 
fueled debate regarding the limitations of prior research and 
the merits of various approaches to managing environmen-
tal impacts (Maas and Rosendaal 2016; Hahn et al. 2016; 
Wright and Nyberg 2016).
Substantively, research has highlighted in increas-
ingly nuanced ways processes and mechanisms by which 
stated, observed, or communicated environmental inten-
tions in companies might be systematically unrelated to, 
or “decoupled” from, their emissions and impacts (Delmas 
and Montes-Sancho 2010). Classically, the absence of clear 
reductions in emissions and impacts associated with a range 
of environmental management practices, communications, 
and stated intentions has been understood to reflect willful, 
strategic attempts to mislead stakeholders through “green-
washing” activities (Aragón-Correa et al. 2016). Where the 
introduction of environmental initiatives reflects predomi-
nantly legitimacy-enhancing intentions, scholars speak of 
symbolic adoption and implementation (Bansal and Clel-
land 2004; Berrone and Gomez-Mejia 2009; Boiral 2007; 
Delmas and Toffel 2008; Delmas and Montes-Sancho 2010), 
whereby firms’ intent to achieve specific environmental ends 
is partial at best. In the context of setting climate change 
targets, prior research has suggested that target setting 
reflects attempts to present a certain image designed to 
create favorable stakeholder impressions of the company’s 
operations and ambitions (Pinkse and Busch 2013). These 
legitimacy-driven intentions may be caused by significant 
stakeholder pressures, including those from NGOs, media, 
and investors (Bansal and Clelland 2004; Darnall et al. 
2010; Flammer 2013). Alternatively, growing adoption of 
various environmental practices may simply reflect compa-
nies mimicking each other’s behavior or attempts to pre-
empt regulatory intervention, once again with ambiguous 
implications for firms’ environmental impacts (Bansal 2005; 
Pinkse and Busch 2013). More recently, more sympathetic 
accounts have emphasized alternative processes by which 
such decoupling arises and persists (Pache and Santos 2013; 
Wright and Nyberg 2016).
What these discussions share is the recognition that 
understanding the underlying intentions and commitment 
to addressing environmental impacts is essential to examin-
ing the relationship between a given environmental manage-
ment initiative and its effects on environmental outcomes. 
Broadly, these intentions reflect an underlying spectrum of 
the degree to which they embody a commitment to improv-
ing environmental outcomes, with relatively symbolic (low 
environmental commitment) intentions at one end of the 
spectrum and relatively substantive (high environmental 
commitment) intentions at the other. For simplicity, our 
conceptual model (summarized in Fig. 1) dichotomizes the 
spectrum of underlying intentions for environmental prac-
tices into two alternative “modes” of intentions that under-
pin firms’ decisions to set climate change targets. In the 
first, targets are primarily conceived of as tools of impres-
sion management among external stakeholders—they are 
classically symbolic in nature and are not associated with 
any real intention to improve environmental performance. 
In the second mode, targets are substantive in nature and 
reflect a firm’s aim to understand, manage, and reduce its 
environmental impacts over time. Since “true” intentions are 
unobservable, we propose that the nature of climate change 
targets as expressed through key target characteristics acts as 
a proxy for underlying intentions. We then hypothesize that 
there is a relationship between this degree of substantiveness 
of climate change targets and improvements in environmen-
tal performance. Moreover, to account for varying firm and 
industry-level contingencies affecting target-setting behavior 
and potential for environmental improvement, we differenti-
ate our analysis by firms’ carbon dependency.
The Influence of Climate Change Targets 
on Environmental Performance
Having outlined our overall model, we begin by exploring 
firms’ intentions and considerations when setting emissions 
targets. Building upon the dichotomy between substantive 
and symbolic intentions for setting climate change targets, 
we argue that only when substantive intentions to improve 
environmental performance underpin target-setting behavior 
will they be effective. Substantive intentions may be altruis-
tic or instrumental, or both (Hahn et al. 2016), but they must 
be minded toward measurable performance improvements 
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(di Norcia 1996). In these circumstances, carbon perfor-
mance targets provide firms with an opportunity to develop 
unique organizational capabilities, which both address envi-
ronmental impact and may be of value to the firm’s broader 
financial performance and strategic aspirations (Bansal 
2003; Sharma 2000).
Consequently, substantive climate change targets have the 
potential to affect both environmental performance directly 
and wider organizational performance more obliquely 
(Foss and Lindenberg 2013). By aspiring to improve their 
environmental performance in a significant manner, firms 
commit themselves to outcomes hitherto unthinkable and 
unobserved. Targets trigger cognitive and motivational pro-
cesses (Sitkin et al. 2011; Zhang and Jia 2013) which direct, 
energize, and encourage persistence needed to work toward 
their achievement, and which indirectly stimulate changed 
behaviors inside the organization (Locke and Latham 2009). 
Consequently, targets have the potential to unleash creativity, 
urgency, and excitement among employees with the purpose 
of collaborating, learning, innovating, and deviating from 
existing routines, habits, and practices to drive significant 
performance improvements (Halme 2002; Winter 2000). 
Substantive goals therefore provide the vital link between 
individual actions and organizational achievement by affect-
ing the necessary cognition and joint production motivation 
of all organizational members, not just of top management 
(Foss and Lindenberg 2013). By contrast, firms chiefly 
motivated by a desire to enhance their reputation among 
stakeholders are likely to set targets for reasons unrelated to 
actual or significant performance improvements. We there-
fore develop the following baseline hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1 (H1) There is no overall relationship 
between the presence of climate change targets and improve-
ments in environmental performance (i.e., reductions in 
emissions).
Hypothesis 1 (H1a) Firms with substantive climate 
change targets are associated with improvements in envi-
ronmental performance (i.e., reductions in emissions).
Characteristics of Substantive Climate Change Targets
Climate change targets are highly heterogeneous in multiple 
dimensions, and thus, once a firm has decided to articulate 
explicit environmental objectives, there is a need to agree 
on and specify more technical/operational details (Maas 
and Rosendaal 2016; Pinkse and Kolk 2009). For example, 
choices include target purpose (internal substantive improve-
ment tool vs. external symbolic signal); whether to target 
absolute emissions reductions or relative improvements (e.g., 
per unit of output, energy intensity); target coverage (energy 
use and/or GHG emissions); organizational scope (direct 
and/or indirect emission); and geographic scope (local and/
or global or a combined, differentiated approach) (Pinkse 
and Kolk 2009). We argue that the detailed characteristics 
Fig. 1  Research model summa-
rizing impact of climate change 
target characteristics on firms’ 
environmental performance
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of firms’ targets are critical in diagnosing the underlying 
intentions that accompany them and therefore their likely 
impacts on environmental outcomes.
In relation to evaluating the relative degree of substan-
tiveness when examining a firm’s climate change targets, 
we build on prior literature by identifying the following four 
target criteria: target type (absolute vs. relative emissions 
reductions targeted); target scope (broad vs. narrow scope of 
emissions reductions targeted); target ambitiousness (scale 
of emissions reductions targeted); and target time frame 
(period over which emissions reductions are targeted) to 
develop our main hypotheses (Fig. 1). Effectively, we argue 
that substantive intentions to reduce firms’ GHG emissions 
can be diagnosed by climate change targets that are absolute, 
include a broader range of emissions scopes, are more ambi-
tious, and include longer target time frames. By contrast, we 
would characterize climate change targets that are intensity-
based, include a narrower range of emissions scopes, are 
less ambitious, and include shorter target time frames, as 
comparatively symbolic in their intention to address climate 
change and thus likely to be more consistent with greenwash.
Target type Companies mainly distinguish between two 
different types of climate change targets: First, absolute 
targets which envisage a reduction in firms’ total levels of 
GHG emissions over time. By contrast, intensity targets 
reflect ambitions to improve energy efficiency and/or green-
house gas emissions at a more relative level (for example, 
to reduce  CO2 emissions per $ of sales, or per employee) 
which therefore do not necessarily translate into absolute 
(or total) greenhouse gas emissions reductions at the firm 
level (Slawinski et al. 2017; Pinkse and Kolk 2009), a key 
criterion in the efforts behind international climate change 
mitigation policies and associated reduction pathways (Stern 
2006; UNFCCC 2015). There is thus a need to critically 
assess the contribution of intensity targets as a means of 
driving significant environmental performance improve-
ments. Specifically, we see intensity targets as relatively 
weaker, outward-looking, and potentially more symbolic 
expressions of firms mainly seeking to enhance corporate 
image. Given that they are designed to allow for uncon-
strained growth in corporate activity, they are more eas-
ily achievable compared to absolute targets which foresee 
complete decoupling of economic growth and emissions. 
Intensity targets also exemplify widespread belief that rela-
tive efficiency improvements are closely associated with cost 
savings (Porter and Van der Linde 1995), thus providing 
extrinsic incentives regardless of organizational attitudes 
toward climate change. This puts into question the effec-
tiveness of intensity targets beyond what is generally seen 
as best practice from a micro-economic perspective. By con-
trast, absolute targets set an inward-looking hard goal more 
closely aligned with societal interests of climate change mit-
igation and whose achievement is prima facie antithetical to 
a company’s overall performance (Pinkse and Kolk 2009). 
We therefore hypothesize:
Hypothesis 1b (H1b) Firms with absolute climate change 
targets are associated with improvements in environmental 
performance (i.e., reductions in emissions).
Target Scope Firms’ next choice about specifying their 
climate change targets relates to the different types of scopes 
of emissions. A primary distinction is drawn between direct 
(“scope 1” emissions) and indirect emissions (“scope 2” 
emissions). Direct emissions stem from activities immedi-
ately controlled or owned by the reporting firm (for exam-
ple, from on-site production processes, direct use of fossil 
fuels in boilers and furnaces, and in-house power genera-
tion); indirect emissions arise from firms’ use of purchased 
electricity as provided by the grid. A third but significant 
category of emissions (“scope 3” emissions) includes emis-
sions derived chiefly from a firm’s supply chain (i.e., car-
bon embodied in procured goods and services), from busi-
ness travel, and those associated with external distribution 
(WBSCD/WRI 2011). Since scope 3 emissions are harder to 
evaluate and measure accurately, these data remain compara-
tively patchier and less reliable but have become an emerg-
ing topic of research (e.g., CDP 2017; Chen 2017).
For the purposes of this research, we mainly distinguish 
between broad and narrow scopes of emissions reductions 
targeted whereby only a broader, all-encompassing view 
of a firm’s scope of emissions is considered reflective of 
substantive intentions to improve environmental perfor-
mance. In other words, we argue that only climate change 
targets including at least two types of scope signal substan-
tive intentions to fully address climate change concerns. By 
contrast, narrower scopes of emissions targeted evoke the 
image of “cherry-picking” whereby firms symbolically tar-
get specific scopes of emissions that are either most likely 
to yield reductions anyway (for example, due to fuel switch-
ing), or are least likely to matter in the grand scheme of 
their corporate carbon footprints (Pinkse and Kolk 2009). 
We therefore hypothesize:
Hypothesis 1c (H1c) Firms with a broader scope of cli-
mate change targets are associated with improvements in 
environmental performance (i.e., reductions in emissions).
Target ambitiousness The third target characteristic 
reflects general ambitiousness regarding the scale of emis-
sions reductions targeted. More specifically, it relates to the 
core premise behind target setting in that ambitious targets, 
that is, those including a larger percentage of emissions to be 
reduced, are more likely to be effective given our initial dis-
cussion on the target-setting literature (Ioannou  et al. 2016). 
Quantitatively more ambitious targets (Maas 2016) therefore 
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reflect substantive intentions which create the internal condi-
tions needed to spur large-scale innovation and performance 
improvement (Collins and Porras 1994; Halme 2002; Win-
ter 2000) but which must also take into account “historical 
achievements, growth paths, and future plans of the com-
pany in industry and (inter)national contexts” (Pinkse and 
Kolk 2009, p. 65).
One issue is that this level of ambition is likely to be con-
text dependent. Given the debate over the relative merits of 
intensity vs. absolute targets (H1b), one argument could be 
that simply having an absolute target is by itself reflective of 
significant ambition. Deciding exactly what level of ambi-
tion to target is subject to much debate and is, for instance, 
considered in more detail by the “Science-Based Targets” 
initiative, which provides a methodology for setting climate 
change targets consistent with climate science. Several con-
textual factors play a role in this process of deciding on the 
level of target ambition, including industry and the time 
frame (H1e) over which they apply. For the purposes of our 
research, we argue that while overly ambitious targets may 
demotivate individuals’ responses to these targets, quantita-
tively greater climate change targets are reflective of greater 
ambition, which is needed to provide a radical stimulus for 
innovation and organizational change that could subse-
quently lead to environmental performance improvements.
Hypothesis 1d (H1d) Firms with more ambitious climate 
change targets are associated with improvements in environ-
mental performance (i.e., reductions in emissions).
Target time frame Finally, while target ambitiousness 
certainly represents one key metric of substantive inten-
tions, the period over which such targets apply adds further 
nuance. Firms that set relatively short-term targets (Maas 
and Rosendaal 2016) may do so because of some form of 
prior knowledge about the likelihood of achieving said tar-
gets, for example, because there is some form of certainty 
about reaching them (“low-hanging fruits”) and/or a coin-
cidence with remuneration cycles (e.g., bonus payments) 
(Kolk and Perego 2014). In these instances, the reductions 
do not fulfill the criteria associated with substantive tar-
gets. By contrast, firms committing to long-term emissions 
reductions are presumably more realistic about the need for 
implementing significant long-term goals as advocated by 
climate science and international policy (Slawinski et al. 
2017). Rather than chasing quick wins, firms with long-term 
targets are more likely to aim for fundamentally challeng-
ing and major strategic change. In that sense, the longer the 
period of emissions reductions targeted (typically the further 
into the future the target year), the more these organiza-
tions appreciate the need for investment in a broad range 
of activities and collaboration to identify cross-sector solu-
tions (Slawinski and Bansal 2012, 2015). One plausible 
counter-argument, however, could be that long-term goals 
may reflect managerial decisions to shift the firm’s climate 
change responsibility to future generations of executives and 
employees, for example, by relying on a technology yet to 
be commercialized, or by deferring instant implementation 
to avoid stakeholder scrutiny (Delmas and Burbano 2011; 
Pinkse and Busch 2013). Given such ambiguity, we state our 
hypothesis in line with our main argument, while acknowl-
edging the potential for opposite effects to materialize:
Hypothesis 1e (H1e) Firms with longer climate change 
target periods are associated with improvements in environ-
mental performance (i.e., reductions in emissions).
The Moderating Influence of Firms’ Carbon 
Dependency
Having developed our hypotheses on how the characteris-
tics of firms’ climate change targets influence the likelihood 
that they lead to reductions in firms’ emissions, next we 
discuss contingencies that are likely to shape their effective-
ness. Prior research has noted that the achievement of targets 
can be impeded when actors find it difficult to identify with 
them, or when targets provoke disappointment and demoti-
vation because progress is slow. Particularly since climate 
change targets may by their nature be associated with sig-
nificant uncertainty in relation to the processes and strate-
gies for implementation, they can create internal resistance 
(Mishina et al. 2010; Sitkin et al. 2011; Zhang and Jia 2013). 
For example, there is the recognition that technological and 
operational “lock-in” due to long and large-scale investment 
cycles determines firms’ performance levels for years if not 
decades (Unruh 2002). Firms’ industry sector, size, and 
existing environmental footprints can constrain the scope for 
performance improvements, thus reducing the salience and 
level of strategic prioritization given to environmental issues 
(Bundy et al. 2013). Pinkse and Busch (2013) referred to 
this as carbon dependency, defined as a firm’s “potential to 
reduce its GHG emissions over time in a cost-effective way” 
(p. 640). This carbon lock-in or carbon dependency indicates 
firms’ level of economic feasibility for significantly and 
credibly reducing their carbon footprints over time. Often 
there are also powerful economic forces at play whereby 
carbon dependency either remains a costless externality or 
only has a marginal impact on overall financial performance. 
In these instances, environmental improvement is economi-
cally disincentivized, thus impacting on managerial decision 
making in response to the presence of climate change targets 
(Eccles et al. 2012).
For example, the interpretation of environmental 
issues as potential threats to the established business 
model or industry order (Sharma 2000) forms a signifi-
cant challenge for firms with high carbon dependency 
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(Ioannou et al. 2016; Pinkse and Busch 2013). Coupled 
with inconsistent stakeholder engagement, for example, 
when firms with high carbon dependency seek to make 
improvements while at the same time lobbying against 
regulatory measures, this can result in managerial tension 
and confusion regarding the real intentions and incentives 
behind corporate behavior (Hahn et al. 2014). In other 
words, despite the formal existence of climate change tar-
gets, managers and employees in highly carbon-depend-
ent firms may not actually be making efforts to reach 
them. For example, Cordano and Frieze (2000) found a 
positive relationship between a facility’s amount of past 
source reduction activity and environmental managers’ 
preference to implement source reduction activities in 
the future. Similarly, Branzei et al. (2004) studied the 
intra-organizational feedback loops involved in environ-
mental strategy formation and found that organizational 
goals adjust in response to performance signals—success 
stimulates more difficult goals, whereas failure triggers 
downward adjustments in goals or withdrawal of effort. 
Thus, where managers interpret past performance as fail-
ure and a losing course of action, climate change targets 
are less likely to lead to improved performance but are 
viewed with suspicion and apprehension and resisted by 
individuals who interpret them as a threat to their identity 
and organizational strategy.
From a symbolic perspective, then, research sug-
gests that firms within polluting industries (i.e., those 
likely to be associated with high carbon dependency) are 
more likely to adopt environmentally friendly processes 
including targeted CEO rewards to achieve legitimacy 
(Berrone and Gomez-Mejia 2009; Maas and Rosendaal 
2016; Russo and Harrison 2005). Consequently, high 
carbon dependency can undermine the confidence in the 
achievement of the targets and so reduce commitment to 
those aspirations. By contrast, in sectors with low carbon 
dependency, substantive climate change targets may lead 
to significant innovation to address a relatively less sali-
ent, but easier to address and, nonetheless, highly com-
petitive issue. Combined with the fact that industries with 
lower carbon dependency also tend to be end-consumer 
facing, there is potentially a stronger argument for these 
companies to express substantive intentions for address-
ing climate change concerns. Hence, we hypothesize that 
carbon dependency affects our hypotheses on the effec-
tiveness of substantive climate change targets:
Hypothesis 2 (H2) For firms with low carbon dependency, 
the use of substantive climate change targets will be asso-
ciated with positive effects on environmental performance 
(i.e., reductions in emissions).
Methods
Sample
Our research draws on data provided by the CDP (for-
merly Carbon Disclosure Project), an initiative led by a 
consortium of over 767 institutional investors with cumu-
latively over US$92 trillion of assets under investment that 
seeks improvements into the transparency and manage-
ment of environmental issues, principally responses to 
climate change, among leading global companies. Each 
year since 2002, the CDP asks the largest companies 
in the world to complete a series of questionnaires that 
probe various aspects of their climate change strategies. 
Company responses to the CDP questionnaire are typi-
cally made publicly available on the CDP Web site, thus 
providing a unique level of transparency and disclosure in 
relation to environmental management and performance. 
Participation in the CDP’s annual survey is voluntary, and 
the levels of participation (by both firms and institutional 
investors), information disclosure, and the depth of infor-
mation requested by the CDP have all grown substantially 
over time. In 2014, the latest year for which data are avail-
able to us, over 4500 companies from around 50 different 
countries participated in the CDP and disclosed detailed 
information about their management of climate change-
related issues. Despite this growth in data availability, the 
use and validity of CDP data in academic research remains 
contested (Andrew and Cortese 2011). To address these 
concerns, our sampling and research approach is based on 
the following observations and decisions.
We sample from the CDP by restricting our attention to 
those companies that actively provide information about 
their climate change targets. We do so first because not all 
survey respondents disclose this type of information; many 
firms that do, however, are willing to admit they do not 
have targets in place. By choosing this sampling frame, we 
seek to ensure that only active disclosure of target infor-
mation is included in our sample rather than inferred. 
Second, the more recent survey data provide responses 
that include target information in a format which has since 
then remained consistent following the standardization of 
response categories. This provides some assurance that a 
more consistent definition of emissions targets has been 
applied. This results in a sample of 3982 firm-year obser-
vations, based on 1335 unique firms from 42 countries and 
across 108 industry sectors that disclosed climate change 
target information to the CDP between 2010 and 2013. We 
complement this sample with CDP data on GHG emissions 
as well as with financial data from Thomson Reuters Data-
stream between 2009 and 2014 to include both leading and 
lagging data.
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Research Approach
The aim of our research is to investigate the relationship 
between different forms of climate change target-setting 
behaviors on subsequent changes in firms’ GHG emissions. 
However, in line with similar research in this area, our study 
is complicated by the fact that firms’ propensity to set cli-
mate change targets and their emissions performance may 
be closely linked. Therefore, to overcome potential selection 
and endogeneity effects, we employ a Heckman two-stage 
research approach (Delmas and Montes-Sancho 2010; Heck-
man 1979). Specifically, in the first stage, we estimate the 
likelihood of firms setting any kind of climate change target 
in the first place. We use a binary logit model based on sev-
eral control variables and industry-adjusted carbon intensity 
as the key independent variable in our estimation of this 
probability. In stage two of our main analysis and model, 
we then use the estimated probabilities of whether firms are 
likely to set a climate change target as a key control vari-
able in our unbalanced and pooled linear regression models 
before adding various target characteristics as independent 
variables to test our hypotheses. This widely used approach 
should overcome the likely challenge that prior emissions, 
targets, and subsequent emissions changes are statistically 
linked. To summarize:
(1) Probability Any  Target(t)  =  f (Industry, Country, 
Year,  Leverage(t − 1),  Size(t − 1), R&D  Intensity(t − 1), 
 ROTA(t − 1), Ind.-adjusted Carbon  Intensity(t − 1))
(2) Environmental Performance = f (Industry, Country, 
Year,  Leverage(t),  Size(t), R&D  Intensity(t),  ROTA(t), 
Probability Any  Target(t), Climate Change Target 
 characteristics(t))
We generally employ a lagged model structure to explore 
the relationship between (and ultimately the effects of) cli-
mate change targets and environmental performance. Spe-
cifically, our model tests whether the presence and charac-
teristics of climate change targets indicated by firms to be in 
place predict subsequent emissions changes. In all models 
in stage two, the absence of climate change targets (of any 
kind) acts as the comparator.
Dependent Variable
Our dependent variable environmental performance is 
operationalized using firms’ greenhouse gas emissions, also 
known as carbon footprints. Measurement of firms’ carbon 
footprints is a complex and information-intensive process 
characterized by the presence of multiple approaches and 
competing evaluation methodologies. Therefore, we begin 
by summing firms’ scope 1 and scope 2 emissions to cap-
ture a firm’s total carbon footprint in each year before 
calculating 1-year percentage changes in firms’ total GHG 
emissions. This measure of firms’ environmental perfor-
mance is therefore based on absolute changes in emissions, 
reflecting substantive (as opposed to relative, i.e., intensity) 
improvements. Our operationalization is consistent with sci-
entific assessments of the need for global GHG emissions to 
peak and decline, rather than simply to grow less strongly, 
to avoid ‘serious climate change’ (UNEP 2015; UNFCCC 
2015). It also follows recent scholarly calls for more research 
on absolute emissions changes as a measure of environmen-
tal performance (Slawinski et al. 2017). We also focus on the 
percentage changes in firms’ GHG emissions, rather than a 
comparison of annual levels of emissions, to help strengthen 
the causal logic of our analyses as firms’ levels of emissions 
tend to be correlated due to the comparatively small changes 
over short periods of time. In fact, initial data inspection 
revealed that firms’ environmental performance tends to 
cluster around 0% indicating the widespread absence of 
significant short-term movements in carbon footprints.
Independent Variables
Industry‑Adjusted Carbon Intensity (stage one only)
To account for the possible influence that firms’ prior carbon 
footprints have on their likelihood of setting any kind of 
climate change target in the first place, again we calculate 
for each firm-year the sum of scope 1 and scope 2 emissions 
measured in tons of  CO2 equivalents of all greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions. We then create a more relative measure 
of carbon intensity that accounts for firms’ economic per-
formance. To that end, we first divide firms’ annual level 
of total emissions by their respective levels of total sales 
before calculating the natural logarithm (Luo 2017). Finally, 
to account for industry relevance of carbon intensity, we 
subtract firms’ respective sector mean of carbon intensity 
(Luo 2017). The formulae below summarize our measure-
ment approach:
(3) ln CARBON INTENSITY (t   −  1)  =  ln  (Scope 
 1(t − 1) + Scope  2(t − 1))/Total  Sales(t − 1)
(4) l n  I N D U S T R Y  A D J U S T E D  C A R B O N 
INTENSITY(t − 1) =  ln CARBON INTENSITY(t − 1) – 
(INDUSTRY MEAN ln CARBON INTENSITY(t − 1))
where the industry mean is calculated for each of the 108 
industries covered by our data.
Climate change targets We draw on Sect. 3 of the CDP 
questionnaire to construct variables that measure the sub-
stantiveness of corporate carbon aspirations. As elaborated 
before, corporate climate change aspirations take a variety 
of forms (Pinkse and Kolk 2009). Defining and operation-
alizing substantive carbon goals therefore require careful 
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consideration and specification. Target information either 
comes in the form of CDP standardized multi-choice 
responses which we further summarize as detailed below or 
allows respondents to provide numerical values. Companies 
often give details on more than one target in place in the 
same year. They may set several absolute and intensity tar-
gets, which relate to different scopes of emissions covered, 
base and target years, percentages, and other metrics. Given 
such heterogeneity, we summarized this information at the 
firm-year level by (a) capturing whether firms generally had 
targets in place and (b) calculating the means of linear vari-
ables to summarize target details. We distinguish between 
the following variables:
Target type We use three different measures to study the 
impact of different climate change target types. First, we 
create an ordinal variable that captures the increasing likeli-
hood of addressing climate change in a substantive manner. 
It assigns 1 = no target in place; 2 = intensity target(s) only; 
3 = absolute target(s) only; 4 = both intensity and absolute 
targets in place. This target type variable is designed to test 
whether there is some form of relationship between different 
arrangements of climate change targets and environmental 
performance. Second, we create two simple binary dummy 
variables each for the presence of intensity targets and for 
absolute targets. Finally, we also include the actual “num-
ber of” intensity and absolute targets each. Our aim is to 
understand to what extent climate change target types are 
important characteristics in shaping firms’ environmental 
performance.
Target scope We create simple binary dummy vari-
ables each for the presence of targets that relate to scope 
other; scope 1; scopes 1 and 2; scopes 1, 2, and 3; scope 2 
only; scope 3 only. The purpose is to differentiate between 
the different emissions scopes that firms can target for 
improvement.
Target ambitiousness We calculate firm-year means of 
percentage reductions in emissions targeted from base year;
Target time frame We calculate firm-year means of target 
periods measured in years. Target periods are calculated by 
subtracting the target years from the respective base years.
Carbon Dependency
Finally, to test whether target effectiveness is shaped by 
firms’ carbon dependency, for our second hypothesis H2 
we rerun our previous analyses based on two subsamples. 
We split our sample into high and low carbon dependency 
by separating observations at the 50th percentile value 
(− 0.0159) for firms’ industry-adjusted carbon intensity as 
calculated before. We employ the subsampling approach 
since this variable is used in the estimation of the likelihood 
that firms are setting climate change targets in stage one; 
hence, reusing the same variable as moderator in stage two 
is likely to create multi-collinearity problems.
Control Variables
In addition to our variables of interest, we control for several 
firm characteristics that have been shown to influence firms’ 
environmental responsiveness (Berrone and Gomez-Mejia 
2009; Cordeiro and Sarkis 2008; Pinkse and Busch 2013). 
They include country (captured here through the inclusion 
of a series of country fixed effects), industry sector (captured 
through the inclusion of a series of 2-digit SIC fixed effects), 
year (captured through the inclusion of a series of binary 
variables for each year), firm size (captured by the natural 
logarithm of the number of employees), ROTA (captured by 
the ratio of pre-tax profits to total assets), leverage (captured 
by the ratio of total debt to total assets), and R&D intensity 
(captured by the ratio of R&D expenses to total assets). To 
assess whether our sample suffers from problems related to 
multi-collinearity, we calculate the variance inflation factor 
(VIF) for each variable finding that VIFs were in the range 
of 1–5 well below the threshold of 10 suggested as indica-
tive of multi-collinearity problems (Belsley et al. 1980). 
Furthermore, none of the pairs of independent variables are 
correlated beyond the threshold value of 0.8. We are there-
fore satisfied that multi-collinearity is not a problem on this 
occasion (O’Brien 2007). Descriptive statistics and bivariate 
correlations between our measures are reported in Table 1. 
They show that out of a total of 3982 firm-year observa-
tions, 3786 (95%) have some form of target in place. Out 
of those, 3186 (80%) are intensity targets, while 3087 are 
absolute targets (78%). Most observations target scopes 1 
and 2 (1923; 48%), followed by scope 1 only (711; 18%) and 
a combination of scopes 1, 2, and 3 (675; 17%).
Results
We begin our findings with the results from our stage one 
analysis (Table 2). Here we use a binary logit model to pre-
dict the likelihood that firms set any kind of climate change 
target. Using industry-adjusted carbon intensities as key 
explanatory variable, the results of the first stage model 
show that this measure of prior emissions is not a significant 
predictor of firms having any kind of climate change target 
as most of this probability is explained by firm size. In other 
words, more than firms’ prior carbon intensities, it is their 
size (here measured by employees) which explains whether 
firms are likely to set a climate change target. Of course, size 
and emissions are also strongly correlated, but we find that 
larger firms are more likely to set a climate change target. 
Our model correctly predicts 94% of observations and we 
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use the predicted likelihood values for every firm-year in our 
subsequent stage two analyses.
Table 3 shows the results of seven linear regression mod-
els in stage two that explore the influences of firms imple-
menting specific climate change aspirations on subsequent 
changes in total GHG emissions. First, model 1 provides 
the key benchmark model in that it examines the influences 
on changes in firms’ carbon emissions by only including 
firms’ likelihood of having a climate change target in place. 
This base model includes controls for two-digit SIC industry 
classifications, countries-of-origin, years, and various other 
firm-level effects. It shows that only firms’ level of lever-
age is significantly associated with changes in emissions. 
Specifically, firms with greater leverage appear to be associ-
ated with reductions in emissions. This initial observation 
remains constant throughout all our subsequent models and 
suggests that firms with greater borrowing appear to be more 
likely to reduce their emissions. By contrast, the probability 
of having any kind of climate change target in place is not 
significantly associated with changes in environmental per-
formance. This means that there is no general relationship 
between firms having a climate change target and reductions 
in their emissions. We return to this important observation 
in our discussion.
Next, in model 2 we include the ordinal variable of tar-
get type finding that this is negatively and significantly 
associated with changes in environmental performance 
(b = -1.025; p = 0.054). In other words, the greater the value 
of the target type, the more likely the firm is to reduce its 
emissions. Given that greater values (i.e., 3: absolute targets Ta
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Table 2  Relationships between firm-level predictors and the pres-
ence of climate change targets
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
DV: Any target 1
B Std. Error Sig.
Constant − 20.605 23134.7 0.999
Firm size 0.537 0.123 0.000***
R&D intensity 0.097 0.067 0.145
Leverage 0.026 0.012 0.031**
ROTA 0.021 0.02 0.303
Industry-adjusted carbon 
performance (t − 1)
0.210 0.278 0.450
Industry Yes
Country Yes
Year Yes
Observations 3654
% Correctly classified 94.14%
− 2 Log likelihood 501.654
Cox & Snell R2 0.224
Nagelkerke R2 0.692
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1 3
only; 4: intensity and absolute targets) are indicative of more 
substantive commitments toward addressing climate change, 
this is an important first result.
To explore this further, model 3 adds two binary vari-
ables for intensity and absolute targets to our base model. 
While we find no significant results for intensity targets, the 
presence of absolute targets is significantly and negatively 
associated with environmental performance (b = − 2.177; 
p = 0.035). Thus, corroborating findings from model 2, the 
presence of absolute targets appears to be a strong predictor 
of companies reducing their GHG emissions. To explore this 
in more detail, model 4 replaces the previous two dummies 
with actual numbers of both intensity and absolute targets. 
We find that firms with more absolute targets are signifi-
cantly and negatively associated with environmental perfor-
mance (b = − 0.682; p = 0.015), whereas firms with more 
intensity targets are significantly and positively associated 
with environmental performance (b = 0.754; p = 0.019). 
While the effect size for absolute targets diminishes, statisti-
cal significance improves. By contrast, having more intensity 
targets appears to become a statistically significant indicator 
of firms engaging in symbolic climate change mitigation at 
best.
Next, model 5 compares the role of different climate 
change target scopes. Differentiating between different forms 
of direct and indirect emissions, only scope other emerges 
statistically significant and positive (b = 2.67; p = 0.064). 
This suggests that by and large the emissions scope targeted 
by itself does not appear to affect subsequent environmental 
performance, except perhaps for targets on scope other than 
those referred to in the Greenhouse Gas Protocol (GHGP) 
(WBSCD/WRI 2011), but which do not appear to be associ-
ated with improvements.
Models 6 and 7 explore climate change target ambi-
tiousness and time frames finding in both cases statistically 
significant and negative associations with environmental 
performance. Both firms with greater average emissions 
targets (b = − 0.049; p = 0.031) and with longer target 
period lengths (b = − 0.113; p = 0.089) appear to be linked 
to reductions in GHG emissions. Broadly, these findings 
provide interesting new insights into the role that different 
climate change target characteristics play as part of firms’ 
efforts to address climate change.
Finally, to further account for firm- and industry-level 
contingencies affecting the potential for environmental 
improvement, we examine the extent to which the effective-
ness of climate change targets is affected by firms’ carbon 
dependency. As detailed in the methodology, we create 
two subsamples based on high and low carbon intensity or 
dependency. Tables 4 (low-carbon-dependency subsample) 
and 5 (high-carbon-dependency subsample) effectively mir-
ror the models in Table 3 by running the same for our two 
subsamples.
In the case of the low-carbon-dependency subsample, our 
results closely resemble those of the complete sample in so 
far as that there is no statistical relationship between the 
likelihood of firms having any kind of climate change tar-
get and environmental performance (model 8). By contrast, 
results for target type (model 9; b = − 1.75; p = 0.042), 
absolute targets (model 10; b = − 3.5; p = 0.038), and num-
ber of absolute targets (model 1; b = − 0.902; p = 0.043) 
again appear to be statistically significant and negative, 
thus highlighting their importance in driving reductions in 
emissions. This time, however, while targets for scopes 1, 
2 and 3 are associated with improvements in environmental 
performance (model 12; b = − 2.406; p = 0.091), climate 
change target ambitiousness and target time frame are not 
statistically significant.
Conversely, in the case of the high-carbon-dependency 
subsample, we only find statistically significant and posi-
tive associations between environmental performance and 
intensity targets (model 17; b = 2.679; p = 0.049), the num-
ber of intensity targets (model 18; b = 0.796; p = 0.074), 
and targets for scope other (model 19; b = 4.567; p = 0.01). 
Yet here climate change target ambitiousness (model 20; 
b = -0.058; p = 0.055) and target time frame (model 21; 
b = -0.173; b = 0.062) are both statistically significant and 
negative.
Generally speaking, our results lend support to our 
hypotheses that firms with absolute climate change tar-
gets, greater target ambitiousness, and longer target time 
frames are associated with improvements in environmental 
performance. This would corroborate our hypotheses H1b, 
H1d, and H1e. By contrast, we find no evidence for the role 
of a broader target scope in affecting emissions and thus 
reject H1c. Looking at the bigger picture, we differentiated 
between the presence of climate change targets generally 
(H1) and substantive climate change targets specifically 
(H1a). Our research consistently showed that the general 
presence of climate change targets is not associated with 
improvements in environmental performance, thus lending 
support for H1. Instead, by and large we find tentative first 
evidence to support an interpretation of substantive climate 
change targets as being instrumental in the achievement of 
emissions reductions. Except for H1c (target scope), the 
three other characteristics appear to be important indica-
tors of the extent to which climate change targets have been 
specified in a substantive manner. These substantive climate 
change targets then appear to be linked to environmental 
performance improvements leading us to accept H1a.
Finally, our results also provide important insights into 
the contingencies affecting climate change target implemen-
tation. Specifically, we find evidence to suggest that different 
characteristics of substantive climate change targets appear 
to be effective tools for emissions reduction among firms 
with different levels of carbon dependency. While absolute 
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climate change target types and broad target scope are sig-
nificantly associated with environmental improvements for 
firms with low carbon dependency, more ambitious and 
longer climate change targets seem to be effective in the con-
text of high carbon dependency. This mixed picture therefore 
somewhat contradicts our hypothesis H2 which had argued 
that substantive climate change targets are only effective in 
the context of low carbon dependency. Instead, we find that 
while carbon dependency does indeed play a significant role, 
it appears to affect climate change target characteristics dif-
ferentially. We therefore reject H2 and discuss the important 
conceptual, empirical, and practical questions and issues in 
our next section.
Discussion
In this paper, we investigate the relationships between the 
presence and nature of firms’ climate change targets and 
changes in their corporate carbon footprints. Drawing on 
environmental management literature, we develop a con-
ceptualization that views climate change targets as reflect-
ing firms’ range of strategic or symbolic intentions about 
environmental performance improvement. Distinguishing 
between symbolic and substantive intentions underpinning 
firms’ ambitions for addressing climate change, we find sup-
port for our baseline hypothesis (H1) that generally there 
is no relationship between the presence of climate change 
targets and improvements in environmental performance. By 
contrast, only more substantive climate change targets are 
associated with reductions in firms’ GHG emissions (H1a). 
These substantive intentions are identifiable by firms’ cli-
mate change target characteristics.
Specifically, we find support for three of our four derived 
hypotheses on the role of corporate climate change target 
types, ambitiousness, and time frame. By contrast, we find 
no evidence in support of the role of a broader climate 
change target scope being indicative of substantive inten-
tions to improve environmental performance. We see clear 
evidence that only absolute, rather than intensity targets 
appear to be associated with measurable reductions in car-
bon footprints, highlighting the need for unambiguous hard 
goals in the quest for significantly lower emissions. Inten-
sity targets, by contrast, which seek performance improve-
ments linked to specific measures of financial (e.g., per unit 
of sales) or operational (e.g., per kWh, employee, product 
type, etc.) output do not appear to reflect substantive enough 
intentions to address climate change. While undoubtedly 
beneficial from a micro-economic perspective, having inten-
sity targets in place seems to create marginal effects from a 
corporate carbon footprint reduction perspective.
By contrast, we do not find resonance with our assertion 
that substantive intentions to reduce GHG emissions are 
more likely to be underpinned by a broader scope of emis-
sions targeted. Except for the low-carbon-dependency sub-
sample, there is no consistent evidence to support the claim 
that the scope of emissions targeted matters for the achieve-
ment of emissions reductions, except perhaps, when firms 
target scope outside the established GHG emissions protocol 
(WBSCD, WRI 2011). Here the results show increases in 
emissions, thus questioning this seemingly symbolic choice.
We also find some, though only weak, early evidence that 
target ambitiousness appears to reflect substantive intentions 
to reduce emissions. Consistent with theory, this level of 
stringency acts as a measure of the degree to which firms 
want to address historical or social performance gaps (Bro-
miley and Harris 2014; Washburn and Bromiley 2012), or 
develop strategic first-mover advantages (Pinkse and Busch 
2013). Mirroring extant findings, we show that targets with 
a larger percentage of emissions to be reduced are indeed 
associated with environmental improvements (Ioannou et al. 
2016; Maas 2016).
Equally, we can report a relationship between target time 
frames and environmental performance. Despite potentially 
opposing arguments, we find evidence for long-term target 
time frames being linked to emissions reductions. Having 
also tested (but not reported) the possibility of a curvilin-
ear relationship, our results suggest that generally speaking 
climate change targets need to account for the significant 
changes required to adapt business models and practices. 
This is likely to play out over significant periods of time. 
Coupled with the radical nature of reducing emissions in 
absolute terms (while allowing for the potential to grow), 
this explains why climate change targets need to be realistic 
in terms of allowing for organizational change to occur. The 
fact that such long-term targets already appear to be linked 
to improvements suggests that managers do not use them to 
pass responsibility to future generations of managers but are 
able to start the organizational transformation. Ultimately, 
however, to demonstrate the effectiveness of target peri-
ods (whose mean is 7.5 years in our sample) significantly 
longer sampling periods will be necessary. One alternative 
hypothesis for future research might be that to be effective, 
firms need both targets with long and short time frames. 
This perspective would allow firms to aim for a long-term 
destination consistent with climate science, but which is 
made more manageable using short-term, interim targets, a 
practice Slawinski and Bansal (2015) called temporal ambi-
dexterity. For this paper, however, longer target time frames 
appear to be indicative of substantive underlying intentions 
on improving firm-level environmental outcomes.
Finally, our analysis dissecting our sample into low- and 
high-carbon-dependency groups revealed a mixed picture. 
Although we generally find that results between the two 
subsamples differ, there is no striking evidence to suggest 
that substantive climate change targets are only effective in 
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low-carbon-dependency contexts. In fact, different aspects 
of substantive climate change targets appear to be effective 
in different carbon dependency contexts. While target type 
(i.e., absolute targets) and broader target scope (i.e., 1, 2&3) 
appear to matter in the low-carbon-dependency sample, 
more quantitative characteristics such as target ambitious-
ness and target time frame are important in the high-carbon-
dependency sample. This suggests that carbon dependency 
may not be the key variable shaping the effectiveness of cli-
mate change targets as suggested in our second hypothesis. 
Instead, it provides context-specific contingencies for the 
different messages that climate change target characteristics 
signal to employees and other affected stakeholders.
Our paper confirms and contributes to the discussions 
about understanding voluntary environmental practices 
through the lens of substantive and symbolic intentions 
(Bansal and Clelland 2004; Berrone and Gomez-Mejia 2009; 
Boiral 2007; Delmas and Toffel 2008; Delmas and Montes-
Sancho 2010). We extend this core conceptualization in the 
sustainability literature by demonstrating its relevance for 
and application in the context of corporate climate change 
ambitions. We highlight that though some practices may at 
first appear to follow similar objectives, in fact the under-
lying intentions may differ significantly. Corporate climate 
change targets vary in their implementation, and this hetero-
geneity can be explained as an expression of firms’ espoused 
beliefs about the need for, and purposes of, setting such tar-
gets. While operationalization remains fraught with limi-
tations, our research gives first empirical insights into the 
variation of approaches and their respective effectiveness 
when it comes to reducing corporate carbon footprints.
Our research also shines new light on the use of organi-
zational aspirations in the context of non-financial perfor-
mance (Di Norcia 1996; Ioannou et al. 2016; Maas and 
Rosendaal 2016; Russo and Harrison 2005). While extant 
research on aspirations suggests that they may be valuable 
tools for fostering financial performance improvements, 
our research adds to the discussions about their ambiguity 
in terms of intentions and effectiveness (Kolk and Perego 
2014). A key difference between financial and non-financial 
performance targets is the potentially oblique way in which 
these targets operate. Apart from pure, ethical motivations 
to address climate change, wider more strategic intentions 
to reduce firms’ GHG emissions may (eventually) lead to 
financial performance and other benefits, however, in more 
indirect ways. This relationship is heavily context specific 
and firm specific but would explain why some firms volun-
tarily set ambitious targets based on substantive intentions 
to reduce their emissions. We therefore extend previous 
research that studied the role of quantitative, hard targets 
as part of executive compensation in improving corporate 
sustainability outcomes (Maas 2016) by highlighting the 
significance of implementing measureable targets for the 
entire firm rather than upper echelons only. Given the recent 
burgeoning of target-driven sustainability initiatives, under-
standing whether and how such ambitions are likely to suc-
ceed will help shape practice in this area.
Moreover, we argued that while commensurability in 
terms of outcomes may be achieved as part of substantive 
approaches which can be driven by both strategic and ethical 
considerations (Hahn et al. 2016), alternative, more symbolic 
approaches designed to enhance organizational legitimacy 
in the eyes of stakeholders are likely to attract accusations 
of greenwash when non-financial performance outcomes 
are investigated (Aragón-Correa et al. 2016; Berrone et al. 
2017; Delmas and Burbano 2011; Pinkse and Busch 2013). 
We show that firms set a variety of climate change targets, 
but for various reasons it is challenging to decouple total 
GHG emissions from financial and operational performance 
(i.e., reduce total emissions while potentially continuing to 
grow). We argue only absolute targets represent a true and 
scientifically justifiable approach toward limiting climate 
change. The fact that other business priorities provide con-
stant challenges to these targets (e.g., business growth and 
expansion, M&A activity, etc.) is one of the uncomfortable 
truths behind setting substantive climate change targets. Our 
results that substantive climate change targets are associated 
with short-run improvements (i.e., reductions in firms’ total 
emissions regardless of firm growth) can be interpreted as a 
tentatively positive sign. It suggests that improvements are 
indeed possible, despite numerous economic and operational 
obstacles. Undoubtedly, firms will face problems along the 
way of achieving their targets, but as long as they are broadly 
in line with the desired long-run aspirations, this is some-
thing to be commended and strengthened.
By contrast, firms setting relatively more symbolic targets 
are clearly engaging in a form of greenwash designed to give 
the impression of caring about climate change while largely 
continuing with business as usual (Lyon and Maxwell 2011; 
Lyon and Montgomery 2015). Stakeholders must therefore 
be weary of any such signals and commitments which may 
give off the appearance of concern while being as effective 
as not having any targets at all. Efficiency improvements are 
important and should be acknowledged as improvements, 
nonetheless, but in the face of business growth, they con-
tinue to add to the cumulative total of global GHG emis-
sions and thus do not align with scientific assessments and 
recent political agreements that demand absolute reductions 
at global (and thus firm) levels.
In sum, our research opens the debate for wider discus-
sions about the interactions of strategic, ethical, and sym-
bolic intentions in the context of aspirations: For example, 
to what extent are symbolic intentions underpinning target 
setting truly recognized as creating legitimacy by stake-
holders? How do employees respond to such comparatively 
superficial targets? Are there any financial performance 
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implications? Understanding the complex relationships 
between substantive and symbolic intentions, ethical and 
strategic considerations as well as both financial and non-
financial performance outcomes will help in disentangling 
the general nuances and contingencies of organizational 
aspirations. Knowledge in this area may also inform research 
on other types of corporate responsibility targets such as 
minority hiring and female board participation.
Limitations
Our research is bounded by methodological limitations 
inherent in working with voluntarily disclosed secondary 
data, particularly given the still developing nature of this 
field. We acknowledge the critiques and questions surround-
ing our dataset, but hope to have provided assurance that our 
approach is robust. Recent legislative efforts to make car-
bon disclosure mandatory for all large firms and investor-led 
efforts toward standardization3 will hopefully lead to more 
comprehensive and consistent datasets in future. This would 
aid replicability of our research, overcome the selection bias 
of firms reporting to the CDP, and address concerns that the 
self-reporting of targets and achievements (i.e., GHG emis-
sions) presents opportunities for unethical behavior such as 
misrepresenting improvements.
While we investigate several years of data, many of our 
effects are likely to require even longer periods of obser-
vation to manifest themselves. Our approach was guided 
by concerns for data validity and availability. Again, with 
growing and more consistently managed data collection, 
future analyses will be able to help shed further light on 
the relationship between corporate carbon aspirations and 
environmental performance, especially target scopes and 
time frames. Given the significant challenges involved in 
decarbonizing the global economy and individual compa-
nies, assessing the endurance of our findings will require 
many more years of emissions performance under observa-
tion. Then, research could also substantiate the extent to 
which firms actually achieve their self-stated goals.
Finally, while we sought to highlight general trends and 
relationships between corporate climate change targets and 
carbon footprints, there is also a need to drill deeper into 
target-setting behaviors at the firm level. Given that many 
of our variables are ultimately aggregated data points, in situ 
observations of the target setting and organizational response 
processes are likely to yield a much richer understanding 
of the intentions and considerations driving individuals 
within firms when it comes to implementing and respond-
ing to such targets. For example, the Science-Based Targets 
initiative provides an interesting research opportunity to fol-
low organizations on their journey toward setting substantive 
climate change targets. Using firm- and industry-level cases 
studies could help in understanding how to grow this move-
ment through increased participation and thus significantly 
increase the potential for business to play its part in address-
ing climate change.
Conclusion
There is a recognized, and growing, gap between the rates of 
reduction in global carbon emissions necessary to mitigate 
the most harmful effects of climate change and the reduc-
tions being achieved in most economies (UNEP 2015; UNF-
CCC 2015). Meeting internationally agreed plans for sus-
tainable development will require a step change in progress 
on emissions reduction, and businesses, as major emitters, 
need to find ways to accelerate progress on reducing their 
carbon footprints. In this paper, we explored whether cor-
porate aspirations for reductions in carbon emissions trans-
late into actual improvements in non-financial performance 
in the context of a large multi-country sample of compa-
nies. Building on extant conceptualizations that distinguish 
between substantive and symbolic intentions underpinning 
firms’ voluntary environmental practices, we find evidence 
in support of our hypotheses that only absolute targets, 
longer target time frames, and greater levels of target ambi-
tiousness are associated with improvements in environmen-
tal performance. While our research does not differentiate 
between strategic and ethical justifications of such targets, 
it supports the notion that ultimately only substantive (as 
opposed to symbolic) intentions for corporate aspirations are 
likely to overcome the most pressing ethical challenges fac-
ing contemporary business and society (Howard-Grenville 
et al. 2014; Vatican 2016).
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